Mediation in the sun
This week is the closing date for members who want to book on the week-long costs mediation course taking place in Malaga from 21-25 September.
The training will be delivered on behalf of ACL by the London School of Mediation’s Faculty, led by barrister Jonathan Dingle FRSA. It costs £1,200 + VAT (travel is at the delegate’s own expense).
There will be a programme of networking and social events during the week and, after the course is finished, participants will be issued with an open-book examination which they will have to complete within 14 days.
Following the course, which provides 25 hours of CPD, delegates will have individual feedback and coaching sessions by the faculty. There will also be a free consolidation and fluency day offered in London or Manchester later in the year to build on the skills.
For more details and to book, please see the ACL website.
Post-LASPO ATE premium backed
Master Leonard has issued one of the first rulings on the recoverability of an after-the-event (ATE) insurance premium covering expert reports in a clinical negligence case, ruling that a Temple Protection premium of £5,680 +IPT for £10,000 of cover was neither unreasonable in amount nor disproportionate.
Sitting as a district judge in Nokes v Heart of England Foundation NHS Trust [2015] EWHC B6 (Costs), Master Leonard emphasised that it is for the defendant “to establish some case to the effect that the claimant’s ATE premium is unreasonable in amount”. It failed to do so here, he said. The defendant had relied on Kelly v Black Horse and Redwing Construction Ltd v Wishart, but the judge said those decisions concerned individually assessed premiums in which it was evident that at least one factor in the calculation of the premium (the assessment of risk, “which a court is well equipped to judge”) must have been wrong.
He continued: “There is nothing in this case to justify any such conclusion about Temple’s block-rated premium. The arguments offered in support of that proposition invite me to substitute my judgment for that of Temple’s underwriters on the basis of broad comparisons which have no validity, and on the basis of calculations and evidence which in my view do not stand up to analysis.
“Nor does the available comparable evidence furnish any basis for the conclusion that the (a) premium is unreasonable in amount. The claimant has, on the evidence, made a reasonable choice of ATE policy from such options as were available to her at the relevant time. I do not know whether or not she and her advisers considered the wider market before she committed to Temple’s policy, but there is no evidence to support any supposition that, if they had, they would have found a suitable policy at less expense.”
Master Leonard was not convinced by the defendant’s argument that Temple’s product was not subject to real market competition. He said: “I need more than suspicion or speculation to reduce an ATE premium. In implementing the 2013 reforms, Parliament intended that that certain kinds of ATE premium should continue to be recoverable under orders for costs.
“For that intention to be achieved, insurers must be able to offer a compliant product which is realistic and competitive. On the evidence, Temple has come up with a compliant, competitive product which the claimant has accepted.”
No fool for a client
A solicitors’ limited liability partnership which acted for itself was not a litigant in person for the purposes of rule 46.5 and was not thereby limited in its recovery of costs, the High Court ruled last week.
According to a report from Lawtel, Judge Purle QC in Halborg v EMW Law found that the partnership could not fairly be described as having been represented by a firm, nor could it be said that it was a partner in a firm; the partnership itself was the legal entity in the proceedings, so the exception in rule 46.5(6)(b) did not apply.
The partnership fell within rule 46.5(6)(b)(v). Given rule 46.5(6)(a), under which a company or other corporation acting without a legal representative was to be treated as a litigant in person, the rules would not make sense if the word ‘person’ in rule 46.5(6)(b)(v) was interpreted as including companies or other corporations.
The Lawtel report recorded: “A company with an in-house lawyer could recover costs at the normal rate, and the same was true of the partnership. The context of that rule meant that it referred to individuals only, and it did not apply to limited liability partnerships suing in their own right. The partnership was not a litigant in person.”